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1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to investigate the dynamic structural connectedness between oil
price shocks and stock market returns and volatility of 11 major stock markets around the
world (considering both net oil–importing and net oil–exporting countries), for the period
September 1995 to July 2013.
The investigation of the time–varying connectedness between oil price shocks and stock
market activity is important given the recent geopolitical unrest and the financialisation of
the oil market. According to Bu¨yu¨ks¸ahin and Robe (2014), Hamilton and Wu (2014), Alquist
and Kilian (2010) and Fattouh (2010), investors and portfolio managers have increased their
positions in the oil market over the last decade or so. Authors, such as, Hamilton and Wu
(2014); Morana (2013); Fattouh et al. (2013); Alquist and Kilian (2010) claim that increased
speculative activity is observed in the oil market due to its financialisation, which leads the
stock and oil markets to exhibit a higher interdependence. Furthermore, events such as the
Arab Spring, the political turbulence and war conflicts in Yemen, Bahrain and Egypt or even
the Syrian civil war have resulted in substantial oil price swings, which spark uncertainty in
financial markets.
In this respect, it is important to identify, for the first time, the time–varying spillover
effects between oil and stock markets and to analyse these effects under the prism of the
aforementioned recent geopolitical and economic unrest. Such approach is useful to market
participants making decisions about portfolio adjustments, asset pricing, as well as, the
development of models for forecasting.
We highlight that the issue of interdependence (either in a static or a time–varying
environment) between financial markets and its importance for portfolio managers, asset
pricing model and forecasting has been extensively studied in the literature (see, for instance
Apergis et al., 2016; Barun´ık et al., 2016; Yarovaya et al., 2016; Barunik and Krehlik, 2015;
Alter and Beyer, 2014; Claeys and Vasˇ´ıcˇek, 2014; Jiang et al., 2012; Alter and Schu¨ler,
2012; Antonakakis, 2012; Buba´k et al., 2011; McMillan and Speight, 2010). Nevertheless,
the literature on the examination of the time–varying interdependence between oil and stock
markets is still growing, whereas this is the first effort to investigate the time-varying spillover
effects between oil shocks and stock markets.
Our study builds upon the study of Awartani and Maghyereh (2013), which also em-
ploys the Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) methodology. Nevertheless, their study investigates
the spillover effects between GCC stock markets and oil prices, whereas in our study we
disentangle oil prices into three oil price shocks by virtue of their origin (i.e. supply-side,
aggregate demand and oil specific demand shocks). As primarily shown by Kilian and Park
(2009), disentangling oil price shocks allows us to understand better the effects of oil on the
financial markets.
To do so, we extend the Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) connectedness measure in the follow-
ing way. Instead of using a generalized vector autoregressive framework in which forecast-
error variance decompositions are invariant to the variable ordering, we propose a structural
vector autoregressive framework that allows for the identification of the supply–side, aggre-
gate demand and oil–specific demand oil market shocks.
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Even more, this study distinguishes between oil–importing and oil–exporting countries,
given the increasing evidence that the effects of oil price changes on stock market performance
are different for oil–importers and oil–exporters. More specifically, oil price increases are
considered as negative news for oil–importing economies, given that the former leads to
higher production costs for the domestic firms, which subsequently leads to higher prices
and lower consumption. The end result is that there are lower cash flows at firm level
and thus lower stock prices (see, inter alia, Jones et al., 2004; Brown and Yucel, 1999;
Hamilton, 1996). By contrast, higher oil prices are expected to increase the income and
wealth of the oil–exporting economies, leading to higher economic activity and thus higher
firm-level cash flows. Stock markets in these countries are expected to react positively to
these developments (see, for instance, Wang et al., 2013; Arouri et al., 2012; Bjørnland,
2009). Thus, we maintain, that oil prices shocks are anticipated to cause heterogeneous
responses from the stock markets, depending on whether these operate in oil–importing or
oil–exporting economies.
The findings of the study stress the necessity to investigate the connectedness of oil prices
and the stock market both over time and by disentangling oil price shocks by virtue of their
origin. In particular, we show that connectedness varies across different time periods and
that this time-varying character is aligned with certain developments that take place in the
global economy. In this regard, aggregate demand shocks appear to act as the main source of
connectedness shocks to stock markets during periods of economic and financial uncertainty,
while supply–side and oil–specific demand shocks during periods of geopolitical unrest.
On a secondary level, we provide evidence that differences regarding the direction and
the strength of the connectedness can be found both between and among the two groups
of countries under investigation (i.e. net oil–importing and net oil–exporting countries)
emphasizing the fact that these differences mainly pertain to the time–varying character of
the relationship between oil prices and the stock market. On a final note, our results do not
indicate any notable differences between current–looking and forward-looking measures of
stock market volatility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview
of the literature review and discusses the contributions of the paper. Section 3 discusses
the methodology and describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical findings, while
Section 5 provides an in-depth discussion of the findings. Finally, Section 6 summarises and
concludes the paper.
2. Brief review of the literature and contribution
Since the seminal paper by Jones and Kaul (1996) there is an ever increasing interest
to understand the effects of oil prices on stock markets (some recent studies include those
by Filis and Chatziantoniou, 2014; Asteriou and Bashmakova, 2013; Ciner, 2013; Lee and
Chiou, 2011; Laopodis, 2011; Narayan and Sharma, 2011; Filis, 2010; Chen, 2010; Miller
and Ratti, 2009). In recent years though, the literature has directed its attention to three
different strands.
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The first strand is related to the origin of oil price changes; that is, to whether oil prices
change due to supply-driven or demand-driven events. Pioneers in this line of inquiry are
Hamilton (2009a,b) and Kilian (2009) who, on general principles, argue that different oil
price shocks should trigger different responses from economic indicators and stock markets.
More specifically, Hamilton (2009a,b) classifies oil price changes (shocks) into supply–side
and demand–side shocks, depending on whether these can be attributed to changes in global
oil production or changes in global aggregate demand, respectively. Hamilton (2009a,b)
maintains that supply-side shocks are related to disruption in the oil supply, primarily due
to geopolitical unrest in the Middle East. On the other hand, demand-side shocks are
related to the global business cycle, suggesting that during recessions the demand for oil
decreases leading its price to fall and vice versa. Kilian (2009) further classifies demand–
side shocks into aggregate demand shocks – which have their origin in changes in global
aggregate demand (similarly to Hamilton (2009a,b)) – and precautionary demand shocks
(or oil specific demand shocks). The latter shocks pertain to the uncertainty about the
future availability of oil, which reflects expectations about the future supply of oil. These
expectations are formed in response to geopolitical events, primarily in the Middle East.
Thus, geopolitical events, such as the Arab Spring, instantly increases the precautionary
demand for oil, given that economic agents form the belief that there will be shortage in
oil supply in the future as a result of these events. According to Kilian (2009), it is the
precautionary demand shocks which are primarily related to geopolitical turbulence, rather
than the physical disruption of oil supply (i.e. the supply-side shocks).
The findings by Hamilton (2009a,b) and Kilian (2009) suggest that, aggregate demand
shocks trigger positive responses from the economy, whereas the opposite holds for precau-
tionary demand shocks. On the other hand, supply–side shocks are significantly less impor-
tant for the economy. A wealth of literature supports the findings reported by Hamilton
(2009a,b) and Kilian (2009) and thus providing ample evidence suggesting that supply–side
shocks do not seem to affect financial markets, whereas positive aggregate demand shocks
(precautionary shocks) exert a positive (negative) impact (see, inter alia, Degiannakis et al.,
2014; Abhyankar et al., 2013; Kang and Ratti, 2013; Baumeister and Peersman, 2013; Kilian
and Park, 2009; Apergis and Miller, 2009).
The second and rather recent strand in the literature focuses on the time–varying rela-
tionship between oil prices and stock markets. Authors, such as, Sadorsky (2014), Broad-
stock and Filis (2014), Filis (2014), Chang et al. (2013), Antonakakis and Filis (2013),
Sadorsky (2012), Broadstock et al. (2012), Filis et al. (2011) and Choi and Hammoudeh
(2010), subscribe to the belief that the relationship between oil and stock markets should
not be examined within a static framework but rather in a time–varying one, given that
the nature of this relationship changes at different points in time. Indicatively, Chang et al.
(2013) focusing on the US and the UK markets, show an increase in the correlation between
oil and stock market returns in the post–2008 period. Similar findings are reported by
Sadorsky (2014) for various emerging stock markets. Furthermore, Broadstock et al. (2012)
also provide evidence that the correlation between energy-related stock returns and changes
in oil prices exhibits a significant increase during the period of the Great Recession.
The third strand is associated with the spillover effects between the two markets under
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consideration. This line of research purports to identify whether there are any volatility
spillovers between oil and stock markets, as well as, the direction of these spillovers (see,
among others, Chang et al., 2013; Mensi et al., 2013; Arouri et al., 2012, 2011a,b; Malik
and Ewing, 2009; Malik and Hammoudeh, 2007). To illustrate this, Mensi et al. (2013) and
Arouri et al. (2012) find significant volatility spillover effects between the oil market and
the US or the European stock markets, respectively. However, Mensi et al. (2013) suggest
that spillovers run from the S&P500 to the oil market, while Arouri et al. (2012) report that
the reverse is true for the case of the European stock market. Arouri et al. (2011b) provide
further evidence regarding the significant increase of the volatility spillover effects during the
global financial crisis. By contrast, Chang et al. (2013) do not report any volatility spillover
effects between the oil market and key global stock market indices (FTSE100, Dow Jones,
NYSE and S&P500).
This paper brings together the three aforementioned strands of existing literature. In
particular, we examine the time–varying effects between oil price shocks and stock market
returns, as well as the time–varying effects between oil price shocks and stock market volatil-
ity – by considering two current–looking measures of volatility (i.e. conditional and realised
volatility) and one forward-looking measure (i.e. implied volatility). It should be noted that
the implied volatility measure is mainly introduced to the analysis for robustness purposes.
Furthermore, much of the analysis in the existing literature does not focus on the various
geopolitical effects that might influence the relationship between oil price shocks and stock
market performance. In our study, we focus on both geopolitical and economic events, as
potential drivers of the time-varying spillover effects between the aforementioned markets.
Finally, the majority of the aforementioned studies utilise either a Structural Vector Au-
toregressive (SVAR) model, when focusing on the effects of oil price shocks or a multivariate
GARCH model, when investigating the time-varying correlations and spillover effects. Our
study extends the newly introduced Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) connectedness measure,
where, instead of using a generalized vector autoregressive framework, we propose a SVAR
framework, which allows for the identification of the supply–side, aggregate demand and
oil–specific demand oil market shocks. Thus, we maintain that our study does not merely
link the three aforementioned strands of the literature but it also uses existing econometric
methods (i.e. SVAR) to extend the current models for measuring spillover effects (i.e. the
Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) connectedness measure).
3. Methodology and Data
3.1. The connectedness measure methodology
The connectedness measure introduced by Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) builds on the Diebold
and Yilmaz (2009, 2012) spillover index approach and on the seminal work on VAR models
by Sims (1980) with the well-known notion of variance decompositions. It allows an assess-
ment of the contributions of shocks to variables to the forecast error variances of both the
respective and the other variables of the model. Using rolling-window estimation, the evolu-
tion of the connectedness measure can be traced over time and illustrated by connectedness
plots.
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However, a key methodological innovation and contribution of this study is that, in-
stead of using the generalised vector autoregressive framework, we adopt a structural vector
autoregressive framework, as it allows for the identification of the oil price shocks. Thus,
the choice of structural variance decomposition is predicated upon our empirical exercise.
That is, to examine the effects of oil price shocks on stock market returns and volatility.
In particular, we disaggregate oil price shocks based on the framework of Kilian and Park
(2009). Essentially, with the use of a SVAR model, we distinguish between three types of
oil price shocks; namely, supply–side shocks (SS), aggregate demand demand (ADS), as well
as, oil specific demand shocks (OSS); and by including stock market returns (volatility) in
the SVAR, we assess the effects of oil price shocks on stock market returns (volatility).
For the general case of a pth–order Structural VAR model, we obtain the following stan-
dard representation:
A0yt = c0 +
∑p
i=1
Aiyt−i + εt (1)
where, yt is a [N × 1] vector of endogenous variables. In this paper, N=4, containing
world oil production, the global economic activity index, real oil price returns and the stock
market returns (volatility) of the respective country, noting that the order of the variables is
important. A0 represents the [N×N ] contemporaneous matrix, Ai are [N×N ] autoregressive
coefficient matrices, εt is a [N × 1] vector of structural disturbances, assumed to have zero
covariance and be serially uncorrelated. The covariance matrix of the structural disturbances
takes the following form:
E[εtε
′
t] = D =

σ21 0 0 0
0 σ22 0 0
0 0 σ23 0
0 0 0 σ24
 (2)
In order to get the reduced form of our structural model (1) we multiply both sides with
A−10 , such as that:
yt = a0 +
∑p
i=1
Biyt−i + et (3)
where a0 = A
−1
0 c0, Bi = A
−1
0 Ai, and et = A
−1
0 εt, i.e. εt = A0et. The reduced form errors
et are linear combinations of the structural errors et, with a covariance matrix of the form
E[ete
′
t] = A
−1
0 DA
−1′
0 .
Imposing suitable restrictions on A−10 allows us to identify the structural disturbances
of the model. In particular, we impose the following short-run restrictions:

e∆Oil Production1,t
e
Real Global Economic Activity
2,t
e∆Real Oil Prices3,t
e
Stock Market Returns (Volatility)
4,t
 =

α11 0 0 0
α21 α22 0 0
α31 α32 α33 0
α41 α42 α43 α44
×

εSS1,t
εADS2,t
εOSS3,t
ε
SMR(SMV )
4,t
 (4)
where SS is the supply–side shock, ADS is the aggregate demand shock, OSS is the oil
specific demand shock, and SMR (SMV ) is the stock market returns (volatility) shock.
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The purpose of the short–run restrictions we impose on the model is to help us iden-
tify the underlying oil price shocks, as it has been established by Kilian and Park (2009).
According to the restrictions for N=4, high adjustment costs forbid oil production to con-
temporaneously respond to changes in demand for oil. Furthermore, changes in the supply
of oil are allowed to contemporaneously affect both global economic activity and the price
of oil. In addition, given that it takes some time for the global economy to react to changes
in the price of oil, global economic activity is assumed not to receive contemporaneous feed-
back from oil prices. However, changes in aggregate economic activity is expected to have
a contemporaneous impact on oil prices and this is largely explained by the instantaneous
response of commodities markets. Furthermore, it is understandable that oil price devel-
opments can be triggered by all types of shocks and in this regard all types of shocks are
assumed to contemporaneously affect oil prices. Finally, stock market returns (volatility)
respond contemporaneously to all aforementioned oil price shocks.
We should reiterate here that disentangling oil price changes into these three shocks is
of major importance, as the literature has convincingly shown that the different oil shocks
are related to geopolitical events (i.e. supply-side and precautionary demand) and economic
developments (i.e. aggregate demand shocks.)
Key to the dynamics of the system is the moving average representation of model (3),
which is given by yt = C(L)
−1εt, where by definition εt = C0−1ut and
∑
ε = C0
−1C0−1
′
.
Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) use Cholesky decomposition, which yields variance decompo-
sitions dependent on the ordering of the variables, whereas Diebold and Yilmaz (2012, 2014)
extend the Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) model, using the generalized VAR framework of Koop
et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), in which variance decompositions are invariant
to the order of the variables. In this study, however, we use structural identification. All
the aforementioned models (including ours) yield an N ×N matrix φ(H) = [φij(H)]i,j=1,...N ,
where each entry gives the contribution of shock associated with variable j to the forecast
error variance of variable i. The main diagonal elements contain the (own) contributions of
shocks to the variable i to its own forecast error variance, the off-diagonal elements show
the (cross) contributions of the other variables j to the forecast error variance of variable i.
This ultimately allows to define a total connectedness measure, which is given by
TS(H) =
∑N
i,j=1,i 6=j φij(H)∑N
i,j=1 φij(H)
× 100 =
∑N
i,j=1,i 6=j φij(H)
N
× 100 (5)
which gives the average connectedness due to shocks to all (other) variables to the total
forecast error variance.
This approach is quite flexible and allows to obtain a more differentiated picture by con-
sidering the gross directional connectedness: Specifically, the gross directional connectedness
to variable i from all other variables j are defined as
DSi←j(H) =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i φij(H)∑N
i,j=1 φij(H)
× 100 =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i φij(H)
N
× 100 (6)
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and the gross directional connectedness from variable i to all other variables j as
DSi→j(H) =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i φji(H)∑N
i,j=1 φji(H)
× 100 =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i φji(H)
N
× 100. (7)
Notice that the set of gross directional connectedness measures provide a decomposition of
total connectedness into those coming from (or to) a particular source.
By subtracting Equation (6) from Equation (7) the net directional connectedness from
variable i to all other variables j are obtained as
NSi(H) = DSi→j(H)−DSi←j(H), (8)
providing information on whether a variable is a receiver or transmitter of shocks in net
terms. Put differently, Equation (8) provides summary information about how much each
variable contributes to the volatility (or returns) in other variables, in net terms.
Finally, the net pairwise directional connectedness can be calculated as
NPSij(H) = (
φji(H)∑N
i,m=1 φim(H)
− φij(H)∑N
j,m=1 φjm(H)
)× 100
= (
φji(H)− φij(H)
N
)× 100. (9)
The net pairwise directional connectedness measure between variables i and j is simply
the difference between the gross directional connectedness transmitted from variable i to
variable j and those transmitted from j to i.
The connectedness measure provides measures of the intensity of interdependence across
countries and variables and allows a decomposition of the connectedness by source and
recipient.
3.2. Data description
We collect monthly data of stock market indices for major oil–importing and oil– exporting
countries, namely, Canada (S&P/TSX), China (SSE), ESP (IBEX35), France (CAC40),
Germany (DAX30), Italy (FTSEITA), Japan (NIKKEI225), Norway (OSE), Russia (RTS)
the UK (FTSE100) and the US (S&P500) from Datastream. The stock market indices
series are converted into real stock market returns using the first difference of the natural
logarithms of CPI deflated stock market indices. The motivation for the choice of these
countries stems from the literature. Specifically, empirical evidence shows that the impact of
oil price changes (shocks) on a particular stock market depends on whether the country, that
the market is operating in, is a net oil–importer or a net oil–exporter. For instance, Wang
et al. (2013); Mohanty et al. (2011); Bjørnland (2009) claim that positive oil prices changes
trigger positive responses for the stock markets of net oil–exporting countries, whereas the
opposite stands true for the stock markets of the net oil–importers. Thus, in order to capture
any possible heterogenous behaviour, our sample consists of the main net oil–importers and
net oil–exporters of the world. In addition, we collect monthly data for oil prices, world
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oil production and the real global economic activity index (GEA), which are used for the
estimation of the oil price shocks. Data for the Brent crude oil price and world oil production
have been extracted from the Energy Information Administration, whereas the data for the
real global economic activity index have been retrieved from Lutz Kilian’s personal website
(http://www-personal.umich.edu/∼lkilian/). The time period of study runs from 1995:09
until 2013:07. Real oil prices and real world oil production are transformed to stationary
series by taking the first differences of natural logarithms. Table 1 reports the descriptive
statistics of the series.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
According to Table 1, all stock markets returns are positive on average, apart from
Japan, where negative returns are recorded. Stock market returns exhibit some variability,
as shown by the standard deviation, the minimum and the maximum values. In particular,
stock market returns in Russia are the most volatile, while stock market returns in the US
are the least volatile. With regard to oil price changes, we observe a positive mean value,
with quite a high standard deviation. In addition, none of the series is normally distributed,
as indicated by the skewness, kurtosis and the Jarque–Bera statistic. Finally, according to
the ADF–statistic, all variables are stationary.
Figures 1 and 2 exhibit the evolution of the series during the sample period. On general
principles, we notice that negative economic events result in lower stock market returns on
one hand and in higher stock market volatility on the other. This finding resonates with
authors such as Bloom (2009) and Baker et al. (2016) who report that major shocks tend to
increase uncertainty in the economy, which in turn, affects many aspects of real economic
activity such as stock markets, firm and industry-level earnings, output productivity, as well
as employment. A stellar example of this is the Great Recession of 2007-2009. As evident
in Figures 1 and 2, during the years of the Great Recession, low returns and high volatility
were in fact a common feature in all stock markets.
Figures 1 and 2 exhibit the evolution of the series during the sample period. All stock
market returns exhibit some common troughs. To be more explicit, in all markets we notice
the significant negative impact of the Great Recession of 2007–2009. In addition, we observe
that for most European stock markets, a second important trough is observed during the first
few months of the European debt crisis in 2010. Furthermore, stock market volatilities also
exhibit common patterns. More importantly, we observe the peak of volatility during the
period 2007–2009, signifying the turmoil that the Great Recession brought to these markets.
However, a second peak in the European stock market volatilities is noticed during the early
stages of the ongoing European debt crisis. Finally, the effects of the Great Recession are
also evident on the changes of oil production, global economic activity, as well as, on oil
price changes, where a significant decline is observed.
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
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4. Empirical Results
4.1. Oil price shocks and stock market returns
4.1.1. Total connectedness measure between oil price shocks and stock market returns
The total connectedness measure between stock market returns and disaggregated oil price
shocks within countries are presented in Table 2.1 According to these results we observe that
on average the total connectedness measures range between 18.7% (UK) and 25.8% (Nor-
way), indicating a moderate interdependence between oil market shocks and stock market
returns for most countries. On average, we show that net directional connectedness for the
whole sample is taken over from the stock market returns in Canada, China, Spain, Ger-
many, Japan, Norway and in Russia, while in France, Italy, the UK and the US, stock market
returns act as net receivers from oil price shocks (see, Table 2). Among oil price shocks,
aggregate demand shocks are generally net transmitters of shocks (with the exception of
China and Russia), while supply–side shocks and oil–specific demand shocks are generally
on the receiving ends (with the exception of Germany, Italy, Norway and the UK in terms
of the former shocks, and of Canada and Spain in terms of the latter shocks). These results
are in line with the literature that emphasises the importance of demand–side shocks, as
opposed to supply–side shocks (see, among others, Baumeister and Peersman, 2013; Lippi
and Nobili, 2012; Hamilton, 2009a,b).
[Insert Table 2 around here]
Despite the fact that Table 2 reveals some interesting patterns on the link between oil
price shocks and stock market returns, we should not lose sight of the fact that during our
sample period several economic, financial and geopolitical events took place, which impacted
both the oil and the stock markets (e.g. the dot–com bubble in early the2000s, the war in
Iraq in 2003, the Great Recession of 2007–2009, the ongoing European debt crisis of 2010
and Arab uprising which began in 2010 and was subsequently succeeded by a series of
geopolitical events such as the Libyan civil war in 2011 and the Syrian unrest of 2013).
Hence, the average values presented in Table 2 are not expected to hold for the whole time
span. Thus, it would be valuable to examine how these connectedness measures evolve over
time. Therefore we proceed with our analysis by presenting the total and net directional
connectedness using 60–month rolling window analysis.2
1The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) suggested 2 lags to be included in the SVAR specification.
Given that we do not use the oil price in levels but rather in returns, we do not need to have 24 lags, as in
Kilian and Park (2009). We have also explored the robustness of our results displayed below by increasing
the number of lags up to 4 and our results remained qualitatively similar. These results are available upon
request.
2It should be underlined that different forecast horizons (from 5 up to 15 months) and different window
lengths (48 and 72) were also considered and the results were qualitatively similar (results are available from
the authors upon request). Thus, we maintain that the results are not sensitive to the choice of the forecast
horizon and/or the length of the rolling–windows.
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The time–varying connectedness measures are illustrated in Figure 3. As expected, total
connectedness between stock market returns and oil price shocks behave rather heteroge-
neously over time and across countries. The range for the total connectedness plots span
from values as low as 45% to values as high as 80% in almost all countries, implying that the
interrelationship between oil price shocks and stock market returns do not remain constant;
although a relative flat trend is observed at around 60% level. This is suggestive of the fact
that throughout the sample period, regardless the economic or geopolitical conditions, the
connectedness between oil price shocks and stock market returns are important.
Furthermore, a peak in the connectedness is observed during periods of economic tur-
bulence and geopolitical unrest, such as, the Great Recession, the 2nd war in Iraq and the
Start of the Arab Spring. Nevertheless, the peaks which are observed during the Great Re-
cession period are unprecedent only for the net oil–exporting countries. This result confirms
the findings by Awartani and Maghyereh (2013) who reported that the interrelationship
between oil and GCC stock markets (net oil–exporters) peaked during the period of the
Great Recession. Another interesting observation that can be made from Figure 3 is that
a peak is observed in the connectedness measure for Russia and China in 2012 (i.e. during
the escalation of the Syrian Civil War), whereas for all other countries, the measure either
declines or fluctuates at relatively stable levels.
[Insert Figure 3 around here]
4.1.2. Net directional connectedness between oil price shocks and stock market returns
In an attempt to further disentangle the link between oil price shocks and stock market
returns, we estimate model (1) using 60–month rolling windows and compute the time-
varying net directional connectedness, as defined in equation (8). By concentrating on
net directional connectedness we can deduce whether one of the variables is either a net
transmitter or a net receiver of shocks within a particular country.3 Thus, we proceed by
examining the net directional connectedness measure between stock market returns and oil
price shocks. Initially, we concentrate on the nature (i.e. net transmitter or net recipient
of shocks) of each one of the variables of interest in contrast with all other variables. The
variable of interest is considered to be a net transmitter of shocks when the line lies within
the positive upper part of each panel. Results are shown in Figure 4.
[Insert Figure 4 around here]
As can be seen in Figure 4, in the early period of our study and until the peak of the Great
Recession, the net connectedness is taken over by the the aggregate demand shocks (ADS),
whereas the reverse holds true for supply–side (SS) and oil–specific demand shocks (OSS).
From that point onward, the opposite roles are observed where supply–side and oil–specific
3Net directional connectedness measures are estimated based on the gross directional connectedness
measures. Thus, for sake of brevity and without loss of generality we only report here the net directional
connectedness analysis. Nevertheless, the gross directional connectedness analysis, can be found in Appendix
A.1.
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demand shocks assume a net transmitting role of connectedness for the largest part of this
period (with the exception of Russia), whereas aggregate demand shocks (ADS) become
net receivers of shocks. In addition, net directional connectedness measures for the supply–
side and oil–specific demand shocks are relatively low compared with these of the aggregate
demand shocks. The latter shocks reach a peak in the net transmission of shocks during
the Great Recession. Overall, these results suggest that aggregate demand shocks (ADS)
are more important compared to supply–side (SS) and (OSS) oil–specific demand shocks,
in terms of their magnitude. This is in line with Basher et al. (2012); Filis et al. (2011);
Kilian and Park (2009), among others, who also find evidence in favour of the importance
of aggregate demand shocks.
Turning to innovations in stock market returns (SMR), these appear to be relatively
stable in terms of magnitude throughout the period of study. However, in most countries
they seem to frequently switch between a net transmitting and a net receiving role.
The net directional connectedness, defined in equation (8), has highlighted the impor-
tance of the aggregate demand shocks in this particular framework of study. However, we
have not disentangled whether the net transmitting/receiving connectedness roles of these
shocks is related to stock market returns or to any of the remaining two oil price shocks.
Thus, we need to extend our dynamic analysis in order to uncover the net directional con-
nectedness between each of the oil price shocks and stock market returns, concentrating on
net pairwise connectedness, defined in equation (9), (see Figure 5). We should note that
stock market returns are considered to be net transmitters (receivers) of shocks when the
net connectedness measures receive negative (positive) values.
[Insert Figure 5 around here]
According to Figure 5, which reports the net pairwise connectedness measures, stock
market returns (SMR) appear to be net transmitters of shocks to supply–side shocks (SS)
throughout the pre–Great Recession period. The reverse picture is observed from 2009 on-
wards, when in most countries it is the supply–side shocks that assume the net transmitting
role.
Pertaining to the relation between stock market returns (SMR) and aggregate demand
shocks (ADS), apparently, in the pre–Great Recession period, the latter, clearly transmit
shocks to the former. With the exception of Russia, this pattern reaches a climax during the
peak years of the Great Recession, while in the post–Great Recession period and up until
2012 stock market returns act as net recipients of shocks from aggregate demand shocks
(although this does not hold for China, whose stock market returns (SMR) transmit shocks
immediately after the Great Recession). Post–2012 stock market returns (SMR) clearly
assume a net transmitting role with respect to aggregate demand shocks, for all countries.
Considering the net pairwise connectedness between stock market returns (SMR) and
oil–specific demand shocks (OSS), this appears to be rather low (with Russia being a no-
table exception) in the pre–Great Recession period, with the stock market being the net
transmitter of shocks. Nevertheless, for most of the period after the 2009, stock market
returns become net receivers of shocks from the oil–specific demand shocks. This holds for
all countries apart from Russia.
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On a final note, there is no clear-cut evidence of any substantial differences between
net oil–exporting and net oil–importing countries. Nevertheless, Russia seems to exhibit a
different behaviour, compared to its group.
4.2. Oil price shocks and stock market volatility
Apart from investigating the various linkages between oil price shocks and stock market
returns, our study further purports to explore the relation between oil price shocks and
stock market uncertainty. We use realized volatility as our measure of current–looking
volatility.4 For the purpose of brevity - given that the core of the analysis remains the same
as in the previous section - we proceed with a succinct exposition of the findings referring
to stock market volatility, merely emphasizing the main commonalities and differences with
findings for stock market returns.
As far as total connectedness is concerned, results are shown in Table 3. The rele-
vant average measure of connectedness assumes values within the range 15.8% (China) and
21.3% (Italy), which is suggestive as in the case of stock market returns of a moder-
ate interdependence among the three disaggregated oil price shocks and realized volatility
(SMRV). Following previous findings for stock market returns, we notice that aggregate
demand shocks (ADS), contrary to supply-side (SS) and oil-specific demand shocks (OSS),
have a net transmitting role. We further note that in connection with stock market volatility,
Canada, China and the US appear to be at the receiving end of shocks during the period of
the study.
[Insert Table 3 around here]
Turning to the evolution of connectedness over time, Figure 6 illustrates time–varying
connectedness measures for realized volatility (SMRV) for all countries. As in the previous
section for stock market returns, we notice that total connectedness behaves heterogeneously
over time and across countries; while at the same time, it also appears to span within a
similar range with values as low as 45% and as high as 85%. A flat trend might again be
identified at around the 60% level. In line with previous analysis, events such as the Great
Recession, the start of the Arab Spring or the escalation of the Syrian civil war appear to
drive connectedness shocks in most countries of our sample.
[Insert Figure 6 around here]
We then concentrate on net directional connectedness between oil price shocks and re-
alised volatility (SMRV). Results are presented in Figure 7. On general principles, results
closely resemble those reported in the previous section with both the peak of the Great
Recession and the post–2012 period acting again as turning points signifying a switch in the
4We have also explored the robustness of our results based on another current–looking measure of volatil-
ity, namely, conditional volatility and the results remain qualitatively very similar with these of the realized
volatility. Thus, for the sake of brevity, these results are not presented, but are available upon request.
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role assumed by each one of the variables of interest. It is worth noting that, although stock
market volatility (SMRV) assumes a dual role for the most part of the period of study, in
the years immediately before the beginning of the crisis it clearly assumes a net transmitting
role of connectedness (with the exception of Japan and Russia).
[Insert Figure 7 around here]
Finally, we turn our attention to net pairwise connectedness. As evident in Figure 8,
results do not qualitatively differ from those reported in the previous section. Both supply-
side (SS) shocks and oil-specific shocks (OSS) begin to transmit shocks to stock market
volatility (SMRV) after the peak years of the Great Recession. Aggregate demand shocks
(ADS) on the other hand, appear to transmit shocks throughout the period of study and
until 2012. In the post-2012 period, aggregate demand shocks (ADS) appear to receive
shocks from stock market volatility (SMRV). With only a few exceptions (i.e. Germany and
the US) connectedness between aggregate demand shocks (ADS) and stock market volatility
(SMRV) appears to act in a similar manner irrespective of the particular group of country
(i.e. net oil-importing or net oil-exporting).
[Insert Figure 8 around here]
4.3. Robustness
Given that the realised volatility of stock market returns is regarded as a current–looking
measure of volatility, we reiterate the analysis between oil price shocks and forward–looking
volatility, with the later now being approximated by the implied volatility of stock market
options. According to Koopman et al. (2005), implied volatility is more informational ef-
ficient and thus it could provide additional information on the interdependencies between
oil price shocks and stock market volatility. Implied volatility represents the market’s ex-
pectation of stock market volatility over the next 30–day period, and as such, can provide
additional insights for market participants’ expectations on the link between oil price shocks
and stock market volatility.
As the availability of implied volatility indices is rather limited, and our econometric
approach very data intensive, we restrict our analysis only to the stock market indices for
which implied volatilities exist from the 1990s. In particular, the countries (implied volatility
series) that fulfill these criteria are France (VCAC), Germany (VDAX), Japan (VXJ), the
UK (VFTSE) and the US (VIX).
As shown in Figure 2, the implied volatility indices are highly correlated with the realised
and conditional measures of volatility. It is also evident that the implied volatility measure
is relatively smoother than the realised volatility one.
The results based on the implied volatility measure are presented in Table 4 and Figures
9–11. Overall, there are no notable differences among the two historical and the forward–
looking measures of volatility, suggesting that implied volatility does not provide any supe-
rior information compared to the realized and/or conditional volatility.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
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[Insert Figure 9 around here]
[Insert Figure 10 around here]
[Insert Figure 11 around here]
As a final robustness check, we repeated the whole analysis, but with additional exoge-
nous variables included in the VAR. In particular with experimented with the MSCI world
index (that represents large and mid-cap equity performance across 23 developed markets
countries, covering approximately 85% of the free float-adjusted market capitalization in
each) in an attempt to control for global factors that might not have been captured in
our main specification. Even after controlling for such global factors the results, which are
available upon request, remain very robust.
5. Discussion
In order to gain a clearer understanding of the aforementioned relations, we now proceed with
the interpretation of the formerly reported results. For the sake of brevity, our discussion
builds on the empirical findings relating to net pairwise connectedness, ensuring though, that
no important information is left out. In particular, we seek to identify which type of oil price
shocks appears to be more important for the stock market, especially at times of recession or
geopolitical turbulence. Nevertheless, country–specific analysis is also being reported, so as
to trace the distinct dynamics of connectedness measures emanating from oil price shocks to
the stock market of each country in our sample. As formerly mentioned, the cornerstone of
our analysis is the Great Recession of 2007–2009; whereas, recent economic and geopolitical
developments (i.e. the post–2010 period) are also of major concern. On a final note, our
discussion revolves around the net pairwise connectedness measures illustrated in Figures 5
and 8.
Prominent among our results is the fact that in the period before and during the Great
Recession, aggregate demand shocks act mainly as net transmitters of shocks to stock market
returns and volatility. On the other hand, oil–specific demand shocks appear to act as net
transmitters of shocks in the post–Great recession period. It is worth mentioning again,
though, that the shocks transmitted from oil–specific demand shocks exhibit an increasing
importance.
In close relation to this, authors such as Basher et al. (2012), Filis et al. (2011) and
Kilian and Park (2009), among others, have already reported the increasing effects of the
demand–side oil price shocks (but more importantly of the aggregate demand shocks) on
stock market performance. In addition, our findings offer support to Degiannakis et al.
(2014) who report that aggregate demand shocks affect stock market volatility.
The general consensus regarding this relationship is that positive aggregate demand
shocks are regarded as positive news about economic activity and as such, trigger positive
developments in the stock market. These positive developments are not only reflected by
higher stock market returns (see, inter alia, Wang et al., 2013; Kilian and Park, 2009), but
also by lower stock market volatility (Degiannakis et al., 2014). In this context, the fact
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that during the Great Recession aggregate demand shocks are primarily transmitting shocks
to stock market returns and volatility, reveals that the negative aggregate demand shocks
observed during this period, trigger negative responses from the stock markets and increase
uncertainty. Furthermore, Bloom (2009) from a different standpoint, provides additional
evidence to support the argument that negative news about global economic activity are
likely to increase volatility in the stock market.
Moreover, the fact that oil–specific demand shocks are transmitting shocks to the stock
markets in the post–Great Recession period, relates to the recent events in Syria and Libya,
which raised concerns about the geopolitical stability of Middle East. Typically, such events
raise concerns about the future availability of oil triggering significant oil–specific demand
shocks, which drive stock market returns (volatility) in lower (higher) levels.
Another interesting finding is that during the last few months of the Great Recession and
thereafter, stock market returns and volatilities are net recipients of shocks from supply–side
shocks, although these effects are not very pronounced. These findings are not in line with
previous studies who have demonstrated the insignificant effects of supply–side shocks in
stock markets (see, inter alia Degiannakis et al., 2014; Basher et al., 2012; Filis et al., 2011).
The consensus is that supply–side shocks do not cause any effects in the stock markets
given that OPEC’s decision regarding changes in oil supply are anticipated by the markets.
Nevertheless, a plausible explanation of our result regarding the effects of supply–side shocks
on stock market returns and volatility could lie on the fact that recent disruptions of oil
supply are not related to OPEC decisions, but are rather related to unplanned oil supply
disruptions caused by the Arab uprising, the oil theft in Nigeria and the closure of Libya’s
ports. Such developments are expected to trigger negative responses from the financial
markets (i.e. lower returns and increased volatility).
Next, we concentrate on the country–specific results. A general comment regarding the
relations of interest is that we are able to point out specific differences not only between
groups, but also, within groups of countries. In particular, we notice that, with the excep-
tion of China, Japan and the US, all remaining net oil–importing countries in our sample
(i.e. the European countries) exhibit certain differences compared to their net oil–exporting
counterparts. As noted earlier, these differences are mainly related to the time–varying
features of the link between oil price shocks and the stock market.
Starting with the net oil–exporting countries, the empirical findings for Canada suggest
that, during turbulent times, aggregate demand shocks play a key role in the transmission
process of shocks to the stock market. Specifically, during the years of the Great Recession
- especially at the heart of the crisis - aggregate demand shocks appear to be significantly
transmitted to both stock market returns and stock market volatility. This is somewhat
expected given the aforementioned analysis in connection with the importance of aggregate
demand shocks for the stock market. By contrast, aggregate demand shocks appear to
be of a rather lesser importance during tranquil times. In fact, during the more recent
years, it is the oil–specific demand and supply–side shocks which appear to be of greater
importance. As previously noted, the importance of aggregate demand shocks for net oil–
exporting countries has also been reported by Wang et al. (2013); however, this study
provides additional evidence which accounts for the time–varying role of both oil–specific
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demand and supply–side shocks. Apergis and Miller (2009) also provide empirical evidence
suggesting that oil–specific demand shocks mildly affect stock market returns in Canada
without specifying though whether this influence relates to turbulent or tranquil periods.
On a final note, it is important to emphasize that, during the years of the crisis, supply–side
shocks were also on the transmitting end of shocks to the Canadian stock market, although
to a lesser extent compared to shocks originating from aggregate demand shocks. This could
potentially be explained on the basis of the importance of current availability of oil during
periods of recession for net oil–exporting countries (see, among others, Antonakakis et al.,
2014; Afonso and Furceri, 2010; Sturm et al., 2009), as well as, on the events that have taken
place since the Great Recession in the Middle East.
As far as Norway is concerned, results are qualitatively very similar to those reported
for Canada. However, both oil–specific demand and supply–side shocks seem to play a
rather greater role in the Norwegian stock market in recent years. Jung and Park (2011)
and Wang et al. (2013) also provide evidence of the persistent relation between the two
demand–side shocks and the Norwegian stock market; nevertheless, this study suggests that
supply–side shocks are also important at different time periods. Furthermore, bearing in
mind the considerable effects of the volatility of the Norwegian stock market, we provide
evidence that even relatively small stock markets may constitute a great source of influence
– provided of course that the country under investigation is major player in the market for
oil.
Turning to Russia, aggregate demand shocks appear to be important for stock market
returns and volatility in the early stages of the Great Recession and until the peak years of
the crisis. In addition, supply–side shocks are also important for both stock market returns
and volatility, especially from the peak years of the crisis onwards. By contrast, oil–specific
demand shocks do not appear to be important. This is in line with Antonakakis et al.
(2014) who further subscribe to the belief that for net oil–exporting countries, both ag-
gregate demand and supply-side shocks appear to be important during periods of economic
downturn, while oil–specific demand shocks are likely to be more important during relatively
even–tempered economic periods. This is true for Russia, although we cannot report any
considerable shocks deriving from oil–specific demand shocks on the Russian stock market
until the very recent years of our sample period. A potential explanation of the transition
of shocks from aggregate demand shocks to supply–side shocks on the Russian stock market
during the years of the Great Recession may lie in the work of Bhar and Nikolova (2010).
These authors, put forward the argument (by referring to specific oil–related global distur-
bances such as the terrorist attack of September 11th 2001 and the 2003 war in Iraq) that,
although on the eve of any oil price shock, concerns within the Russian economy are mainly
demand driven. Eventually, at a later stage, Russia always acts as a resilient supplier of
oil on every disturbing occasion; thereby raising concerns for future oil availability. In fact,
Bhar and Nikolova (2010) provide historical evidence to support the argument that during
such events, oil production within Russia has typically increased compared to production
within other oil–producing countries. With regard to the prominence gained in recent years
by shocks deriving from oil–specific demand shocks on the Russian stock market, authors
such as Aleklett et al. (2010) explain that there have been considerations recently, regarding
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future oil production and thus oil availability within Russia, implying that a more targeted
national policy regarding the security of future oil resources is rather essential. Reiterating
a point made earlier, concerns regarding the future availability of oil in Russia (i.e. the
resilient supplier) are likely to rise, especially in view of escalating upheaval in the Middle
East.
Next, we concentrate on the net oil–importers, starting with the the Chinese stock mar-
ket. We notice that during the years of the Great Recession, aggregate demand shocks are
very important in the transmission process of shocks to both Chinese stock market returns
and volatility; while clearly, supply–side shocks also assume a net transmitting role. Con-
versely, oil–specific demand shocks do not appear to be important throughout the years of
the crisis. In turn, in the post–2012 period, oil–specific demand shocks appear to be im-
portant for Chinese stock market returns but not for stock market volatility. Considering
that China is the world’s second largest oil–importer (IEA, 2013), demand for oil can be a
crucial factor affecting both stock market returns and volatility. Thus, the fact that Chinese
stock market volatility is not receiving any shocks from oil–specific demand shocks in the
post–2012 period is rather unexpected. It is worth mentioning though, that in recent years,
authors such as Yuan et al. (2008), Zhang et al. (2009), as well as, Ma et al. (2012, 2011)
raise concerns about the future availability of oil in China and stress the necessity for the
formulation of appropriate governmental policies to secure oil reserves within the country,
and shield the country against abrupt rises in the price of oil. Hence, potentially the Chinese
stock market volatility does not currently react to oil–specific demand shocks anticipating
that the new policy initiatives will be successfully implemented.
In Japan, aggregate demand shocks appear to be the dominant transmitters of shocks
to both stock market characteristics especially during the first years of the crisis; however,
these shocks seem to be more important in the transmisison process of connectedness to
stock market volatility than to stock market returns. In addition, the same period is also
characterised by the net transmitting role of oil–specific demand shocks. Empirical evidence
related to the results presented in our study, can be found in the work of authors such as
Abhyankar et al. (2013), who emphasize both the significant impact of aggregate demand
shocks and the negative impact of oil–specific demand shocks on Japanese stock market
returns. In addition, authors, such as Chang et al. (2013), emphasize that oil price shocks
are, in general, key factors in explaining stock market volatility in Japan. Turning to the
post–2012 period, connectedness mainly originates from supply–side and oil–specific demand
shocks. These results are expected given the evidence provided by Abhyankar et al. (2013)
and Chang et al. (2013) and the aforementioned geopolitical events that have taken place
during this period.
Connectedness during the years of the Great Recession in the US is mainly taken over
from aggregate demand shocks, especially during the first years of the crisis. We should
note however, that this transmission process appears to be more important for stock market
returns. Our results suggest, though, that there is definitely a key role for supply–side and
oil–specific demand shocks during the latter part of our study. Once again, even in the
case of the US we observe the impact of the recent events in the Middle East in the stock
market returns and volatility. Our findings are somewhat in line with the empirical evidence
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by Kilian and Park (2009), who argue that supply–side shocks are less important to the
US stock market, compared to the two demand–side shocks. Nevertheless, in this study we
point out that the importance of each oil price shock to stock market returns and volatility
cannot be examined in a static environment as it clearly depends on events that take place
at different time periods.
Finally, aggregate demand shocks are the front runners of connectedness during the Great
Recession in European countries. However, volatility in European stock markets appears to
also be influenced by both supply–side and oil–specific demand shocks. It is worth noting
that most existing studies on European stock markets concentrate on stock market returns
(i.e. excluding stock market volatility) within a static framework in order to provide evidence
that entails either a minimum or a negligible influence originating from supply–side shocks.
From the few studies focusing on the stock market volatility in Europe, Degiannakis et al.
(2014) provide specific evidence that it is aggregate demand shocks rather than the other
two that mostly influence volatility in European stock markets. Apparently, though, at
turbulent economic or geopolitical times, supply–side and oil–specific demand shocks are
also important for the volatility of European stock markets given that these shocks act as
net transmitters, too. Especially the net transmitting role of the oil–specific demand shocks
to both stock market returns and volatility in European countries that is observed in the
post–2012 period signifies the importance of the ongoing Middle East crisis to these stock
markets.
In conclusion, our results suggest that aggregate demand shocks are the main trans-
mitters of shocks to the stock markets during periods of economic turbulence, whereas
supply–side and oil–specific demand shocks seem to increase the connectedness during peri-
ods of geopolitical unrest. Our findings also indicate the importance of adopting a dynamic
approach so as to capture the relevance of each type of shock and to trace similarities and
differences between the various types of countries over time.
6. Conclusion
Attaining deeper understanding regarding the relationship between oil price shocks and the
stock market appears to be of major concern to recent relevant literature. Contemporary
research in this field typically breaks down into three main strands; that is, (i) the inves-
tigation of the effects of oil price shocks on the stock market considering the origin of the
shock, (ii) the investigation of whether there exists a time-varying relationship between oil
prices and the stock market, as well as, (iii) the investigation of potential spillover effects
between the said markets.
In this respect, the main contribution of this study is that it combines all three afore-
mentioned strands of related literature in order to investigate the connectedness between oil
price shocks (i.e. shocks disaggregated by virtue of their origin) and 11 major stock mar-
kets of the world (including both stock markets of net oil-importing and of net oil-exporting
countries), within a time-varying framework. The period of the study spans from September
1995 to July 2013. The employed methodology is the one proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz
(2014), which in this study is being further extended by the application of a structural vec-
19
tor autoregressive framework that allows for the identification of the three different types of
oil price shocks. It follows that this study adds to existing literature not only in terms of
introducing new evidence regarding the relationship under investigation, but also, in terms
of further exploiting existing econometric methods.
Furthermore, this study concentrates on two stock market characteristics; namely, stock
market returns and stock market volatility. One of the major concerns of the authors is
to also investigate whether consistent results regarding the behaviour of both stock market
characteristics can indeed be obtained (whether, for example, a negative shock that triggers
negative responses from stock market returns also creates higher stock market volatility).
We employ both current–looking (conditional and realised) and forward–looking (implied)
measures of stock market volatility in order to investigate whether the forward–looking
measure can indeed provide better information, as has been suggested by the literature.
The implementation of the specific econometric method allows for the investigation of
connectedness from three different angles. In particular, we are able to calculate total, gross
directional, as well as, net directional connectedness measures between oil price shocks and
the stock market. Total and gross directional connectedness measures, draw a broader pic-
ture of the relationship under investigation, providing information about the magnitude,
the trend, as well as, the level of shocks either received or transmitted by each one of the
variables of the study. Net directional connectedness measures, on the other hand, provide
specific information regarding the role of each variable under investigation throughout the
period of study (i.e. net transmitter or net recipient of shocks). What is more, net direc-
tional connectedness measures can be further specified in order to facilitate a net pairwise
investigation approach (i.e. net effects between variables).
Empirical findings suggest that considering both a time–varying framework of study and
the disaggregation of oil price shocks by virtue of their origin is of cardinal importance. To be
more explicit, we provide evidence that connectedness indeed varies across time and that its
direction and magnitude is closely related to global economic developments. Furthermore,
we find that not all types of oil price shocks transmit shocks to the stock market at the
same time, but rather, this also depends on the specific period under investigation. More
specifically, considering net pairwise connectedness, our evidence indicates that aggregate
demand shocks appear to be net transmitters of shocks to the stock market during turbulent
economic periods (e.g. during the years of the Great Recession), while both supply–side and
oil–specific demand shocks act as net transmitters of shocks during periods characterised by
intense global geopolitical unrest.
Results are also indicative of the fact that connectedness may differ not only between
the two groups of countries under investigation (i.e. net oil–importing and net oil–exporting
countries) but also among the countries of each group. These differences can be partly
attributed to the time-varying character of the relationship between oil price shocks and
the stock market. What is more, we provide no evidence that the forward-looking measure
of stock market volatility provides superior information compared to the current-looking
measure.
Our findings are important to investors and portfolio managers who have positions to
both the oil and the stock markets and thus need to adjust their holdings according to
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the level of connectedness of the two markets. In particular, investors should strongly
consider the fact that different oil price shocks transmit different shocks over different time
periods that result in different correlations within a portfolio comprising investments in both
markets. For instance, shocks originating from aggregate demand shocks tend to strengthen
the co–movement of the two markets, while shocks originating from both supply–side and
oil–specific demand shocks entail negative correlation. These results are also important to
investors who participate in the options market given that volatility is the key component of
option pricing. Thus, they need to be aware of the time–varying nature of potential shocks
that oil price shocks transmit to stock market volatility.
An exciting avenue for future research may include the examination of connectedness
between oil price shocks and industrial sectors rather than aggregate stock indices. Aggre-
gate stock market indices may mask the individual characteristics of the industrial sectors.
Finally, the examination of interdependence between oil price shocks and other financial
assets (e.g. exchange rates) and commodity price indices (e.g. gold or food), which form
part of investment portfolios, is an interesting area for further research. In close relation
to this, in order to make the analysis more relevant to actual trading strategies, potential
future research should also involve stock index futures data as, according to authors such
as Yarovaya et al. (2016), these instruments present investors with greater opportunities for
diversification.
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Figure 1: Oil production growth, oil returns, general economic activity & stock market returns
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Figure 2: Stock market returns’ realised volatility, conditional volatility & implied volatility
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Figure 3: Total connectedness measure between oil price shocks and stock market returns
 
Note: Shading denotes US recessions as defined by the NBER.
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Figure 4: Net directional connectedness of oil price shocks and stock market returns
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Figure 5: Net pairwise connectedness between oil price shocks and stock market returns
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Figure 6: Total connectedness measure between oil price shocks and stock market realised volatility
 
Note: Shading denotes US recessions as defined by the NBER.
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Figure 7: Net directional connectedness of oil price shocks and stock market realised volatility
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Figure 8: Net pairwise connectedness between oil price shocks and stock market realised volatility
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Figure 9: Total connectedness measure between oil price shocks and stock market implied volatility
 
Note: Shading denotes US recessions as defined by the NBER.
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Figure 10: Net directional connectedness of oil price shocks and stock market implied volatility
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Figure 11: Net pairwise connectedness between oil price shocks and stock market implied volatility
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, 1995:09 – 2013:07
Series Obs Mean Std Min Max Skewness Excess Kurtosis Jarque-Bera ADF
Global Economic Activity (GEA) 215 2.1896 27.674 -50.300 59.100 0.2286 -0.9843** 10.502** -2.993*
∆ ln(OIL PRICE) 214 0.0087 0.0898 -0.3110 0.2007 -0.7755** 1.0657** 31.574** -11.93**
∆ ln(OIL PROD) 214 0.0012 0.0080 -0.0249 0.0259 -0.0877 1.0379** 9.8796** -15.05**
Oil-Exporting Countries
Returns
∆ ln(S&P/TSX) 214 0.0060 0.0599 -0.3695 0.1612 -1.4062** 6.5226** 449.88*** -12.10**
∆ ln(OSE) 214 0.0079 0.0742 -0.4369 0.1972 -1.2884** 5.3154** 311.13** -11.72**
∆ ln(RTS) 214 0.0122 0.1431 -0.6173 0.5408 -0.8889** 3.4226** 132.63** -12.02**
Realised Volatility
S&P/TSXRV 214 18.662 11.523 3.8878 103.42 3.2010** 16.880** 2987.7** -5.625**
OSERV 214 25.092 16.134 2.5305 121.67 2.5882** 9.4901** 1071.2** -5.429**
RTSRV 214 35.848 21.490 8.1671 150.17 1.8686** 5.0095** 358.06** -6.213**
Conditional Volatility
S&P/TSXCV 214 19.382 10.327 7.62 83.330 3.2923** 15.620** 2574.2** -3.904**
OSECV 214 26.345 14.153 11.68 108.12 2.7971** 10.813** 1327.7** -3.791**
RTSCV 214 39.010 19.942 17.8 137.10 1.8442** 4.0907** 271.78** -4.990**
Oil-Importing Countries
Returns
∆ ln(SSE) 214 0.0061 0.0821 -0.2244 0.2642 0.3352* 0.4194 5.5767 -13.55**
∆ ln(IBEX35) 214 0.0037 0.0639 -0.2361 0.1595 -0.6319** 1.1885** 26.838** -13.64**
∆ ln(CAC40) 214 0.0035 0.0610 -0.2533 0.1205 -1.0182** 1.9321** 70.265** -13.34**
∆ ln(DAX30) 214 0.0059 0.0670 -0.2714 0.1674 -0.7328** 1.6925** 44.693** -13.32**
∆ ln(FTSEITA) 214 0.0002 0.0663 -0.2597 0.2328 -0.4310** 1.6908** 32.119** -13.89**
∆ ln(NIKKEI225) 214 -0.0010 0.0663 -0.2089 0.1965 -0.2930 0.8285* 9.1839* -14.99**
∆ ln(FTSE100) 214 0.0027 0.0519 -0.2704 0.1255 -1.2230** 3.4775** 161.18** -13.91**
∆ ln(S&P500) 214 0.0049 0.0478 -0.2729 0.1189 -1.1524** 4.5503** 231.99** -14.39**
Realised Volatility
SSERV 214 23.920 11.704 7.0870 82.426 1.4583** 2.7164** 145.61** -8.594**
IBEX35RV 214 23.389 12.714 3.2046 99.467 1.9250** 6.6881** 545.90** -6.133**
CAC40RV 214 22.681 12.319 5.3115 99.453 2.1910** 7.9025** 748.46** -5.788**
DAX30RV 214 23.325 12.549 4.7649 90.901 1.7591** 4.7469** 320.02** -5.885**
FTSEITARV 214 23.446 12.934 4.6273 96.709 1.8891** 5.6263** 421.02** -6.263**
NIKKEI225RV 214 23.152 10.558 2.3874 94.151 2.1821** 9.6313** 1024.9** -8.408**
FTSE100RV 214 18.753 11.131 3.3155 101.96 2.9811** 15.506** 2529.7** -6.091**
S&P500RV 214 17.442 10.105 6.5368 82.923 2.6828** 4.5503** 231.99** -5.677**
Conditional Volatility
SSECV 214 27.692 9.4193 15.9 72.890 1.3310** 2.0001** 99.315** -5.800**
IBEX35CV 214 24.430 10.989 10.83 77.720 1.7970** 4.7329** 316.38** -4.550**
CAC40CV 214 23.572 10.390 12.28 77.990 2.1600** 6.6607** 564.61** -4.187**
DAX30CV 214 24.287 10.951 9.76 73.850 1.7473** 3.9558** 249.59** -4.362**
FTSEITACV 214 24.660 11.154 10.61 78.900 1.8456** 4.5224** 305.28** -4.592**
NIKKEI225CV 214 24.246 7.745 14.54 68.170 2.2301** 7.8911** 736.03** -5.773**
FTSE100CV 214 19.506 9.5082 9.38 81.900 2.9814** 13.460** 1941.6** -4.442**
S&P500CV 214 18.125 9.1764 7.78 73.230 2.7666** 11.337** 1425.6** -4.495**
Implied Volatility
VCAC 163 24.206 9.2617 11.483 64.330 1.4167** 2.5517** 101.77** -3.923**
VDAX 214 24.842 10.168 10.580 64.110 1.4276** 1.8293** 80.492** -3.641**
VXJ 187 26.428 9.5090 13.580 76.350 2.4537** 7.9706** 613.29** -5.530**
VFTSE 163 21.286 9.3322 10.294 63.260 1.7085** 3.8682** 186.47** -4.060**
VIX 214 21.616 8.6736 10.050 69.250 2.1415** 7.2211** 493.42** -3.945**
Note: ADF denotes Augmented Dickey Fuller tests with 5% and 1% critical values of -2.88 and -3.46,
respectively. * and ** indicate significance at 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2: Oil price shocks and stock market returns, connectedness table (1995:09 – 2013:07)
CAN CHN
From (j) From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMR From others SS ADS OSS SMR From others
SS 78.6 6.4 7.7 7.3 21.4 84.0 7.4 6.0 2.6 16.0
ADS 2.2 78.2 3.3 16.4 21.8 1.9 57.6 3.3 37.2 42.4
OSS 6.1 7.9 76.4 9.7 23.6 6.8 7.2 78.0 7.9 22.0
SMR 7.8 8.8 15.9 67.5 32.5 3.2 2.0 4.8 89.9 10.1
Contr. to others 16.1 23.0 26.9 33.4 Tot. Connectedness 12.0 16.7 14.0 47.7 Tot. Connectedness
Contr. incl. own 94.7 101.2 103.2 100.9 Measure=24.8% 95.9 74.3 92.1 137.7 Measure=22.6%
Net connectedness -5.3 1.2 3.3 0.9 -4 -25.7 -8 37.6
ESP FRA
From (j) From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMR From others SS ADS OSS SMR From others
SS 81.6 7.2 6.4 4.8 18.4 81.8 6.4 6.6 5.2 18.2
ADS 2.1 85.2 4.4 8.3 14.8 2.6 82.2 3.9 11.4 17.8
OSS 6.0 6.8 80.7 6.4 19.3 6.3 7.6 79.8 6.3 20.2
SMR 8.8 7.6 2.6 81.0 19.0 7.7 7.4 8.4 76.5 23.5
Contr. to others 16.9 21.6 13.3 19.5 Tot. Connectedness 16.6 21.4 18.9 22.9 Tot. Connectedness
Contr. incl. own 98.6 106.8 94.1 100.5 Measure=17.9% 98.4 103.6 98.7 99.4 Measure=19.9%
Net connectedness -1.5 6.8 6 0.5 -1.6 3.6 -1.3 -0.6
GER ITA
From (j) From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMR From others SS ADS OSS SMR From others
SS 83.6 5.9 6.0 4.5 16.4 82.1 6.3 6.9 4.7 17.9
ADS 2.5 83.1 3.8 10.6 16.9 2.8 87.1 5.3 4.8 12.9
OSS 6.9 7.7 78.7 6.7 21.3 6.0 6.9 79.9 7.2 20.1
SMR 9.2 7.0 4.0 79.9 20.1 11.9 8.5 4.6 74.9 25.1
Contr. to others 18.6 20.6 13.8 21.8 Tot. Connectedness 20.7 21.7 16.9 16.7 Tot. Connectedness
Contr. incl. own 102.2 103.6 92.5 101.7 Measure=18.7% 102.8 108.7 96.8 91.6 Measure=19.0%
Net connectedness 2.2 3.7 -7.5 1.7 2.8 8.8 -3.2 -8.4
JPN NOR
From (j) From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMR From others SS ADS OSS SMR From others
SS 83.4 5.1 5.5 5.9 16.6 82.9 9.2 6.6 1.3 17.1
ADS 2.9 81.2 5.6 10.3 18.8 2.6 77.2 5.4 14.8 22.8
OSS 6.3 6.9 79.8 7.0 20.2 6.5 9.8 79.6 4.1 20.4
SMR 3.9 9.1 4.8 82.2 17.8 7.8 4.3 1.8 86.1 13.0
Contr. to others 13.0 21.1 16.0 23.2 Tot. Connectedness 18.8 51.9 10.5 22.0 Tot. Connectedness
Contr. incl. own 96.5 102.4 95.8 105.4 Measure=18.3% 90.8 139.1 83.6 86.5 Measure=25.8%
Net connectedness -3.6 2.3 -4.2 5.4 1.7 29.1 -9.9 9
RUS UK
From (j) From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMR From others SS ADS OSS SMR From others
SS 77.7 11.1 5.2 6.1 22.3 82.9 7.6 6.6 2.9 17.1
ADS 2.3 76.7 2.9 18.1 23.3 2.5 88.6 3.8 5.1 11.4
OSS 8.5 9.2 71.3 10.9 28.7 6.6 7.5 79.3 6.5 20.7
SMR 1.4 4.0 1.6 93.0 7.0 9.4 8.2 7.9 74.6 25.4
Contr. to others 18.0 18.7 20.8 23.3 Tot. Connectedness 18.5 23.3 18.3 14.6 Tot. Connectedness
Contr. incl. own 99.9 103.6 96.5 100.1 Measure=20.2% 101.4 111.9 97.6 89.1 Measure=18.7%
Net connectedness -4.3 -4.6 -7.9 16.3 1.4 11.9 -2.4 -10.8
US
From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMR From others
SS 79.9 7.7 6.4 6.0 20.1
ADS 2.5 91.2 4.0 2.3 8.8
OSS 6.6 8.6 76.6 8.2 23.4
SMR 9.5 9.1 6.6 74.8 25.2
Contr. to others 18.6 25.4 17.0 16.4 Tot. Connectedness
Contr. incl. own 98.5 116.6 93.7 91.2 Measure=19.4%
Net connectedness -1.5 16.6 -6.4 -8.8
Note: Connectedness measures, given by Equations (2)-(6), calculated from variance decompositions based
on 12-step-ahead forecasts.
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Table 3: Oil price shocks and stock market realised volatility, connectedness table (1995:09 – 2013:07)
CAN CHN
From (j) From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMRV From others SS ADS OSS SMRV From others
SS 79.0 8.1 7.3 5.6 21.0 82.4 7.6 6.0 4.0 17.6
ADS 2.0 89.4 4.1 4.5 10.6 2.6 92.3 3.6 1.5 7.7
OSS 6.9 8.4 75.3 9.5 24.7 5.1 10.1 80.7 4.0 19.3
SMRV 4.5 4.2 10.9 80.3 19.7 10.2 6.0 2.6 81.3 18.7
Contr. to others 13.4 20.8 22.4 19.5 Tot. Connectedness 17.9 23.7 12.2 9.4 Tot. Connectedness
Contr. incl. own 92.4 110.2 97.6 99.8 Measure=19.0% 100.4 116.0 92.9 90.7 Measure=15.8%
Net connectedness -7.6 10.2 -2.3 -0.2 0.3 16.0 -7.1 -9.3
ESP FRA
From (j) From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMRV From others SS ADS OSS SMRV From others
SS 81.8 6.7 6.9 4.6 18.2 81.2 7.3 6.9 4.5 18.8
ADS 2.8 76.2 3.6 17.4 23.8 2.7 85.5 2.5 9.3 14.5
OSS 6.5 7.1 74.9 11.4 25.1 6.7 8.6 72.4 12.3 27.6
SMRV 2.4 3.7 7.4 86.5 13.5 8.3 5.9 6.0 79.8 20.2
Contr. to others 11.7 17.5 17.9 33.5 Tot. Connectedness 17.6 21.8 15.4 26.2 Tot. Connectedness
Contr. incl. own 93.5 93.7 92.8 120.0 Measure=20.1% 98.8 107.3 87.8 106.0 Measure=20.2%
Net connectedness -6.5 -6.3 -7.2 20 -1.2 7.3 -12.2 6
GER ITA
From (j) From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMRV From others SS ADS OSS SMRV From others
SS 82.2 7.0 6.8 4.0 17.8 83.5 6.9 6.5 3.1 16.5
ADS 2.5 88.3 2.7 6.4 11.7 3.7 74.9 3.8 17.6 25.1
OSS 7.0 8.2 72.9 11.9 27.1 6.3 6.4 76.6 10.8 23.4
SMRV 9.3 6.7 4.4 79.6 20.4 6.0 6.2 7.8 80.0 20.0
Contr. to others 18.8 22.0 14.0 22.2 Tot. Connectedness 16.0 19.5 18.2 31.4 Tot. Connectedness
Contr. incl. own 101.0 110.3 86.9 101.8 Measure=19.3% 99.5 94.3 94.7 111.4 Measure=21.3%
Net connectedness 1.0 10.3 -13.1 1.8 -0.5 -5.6 -5.2 11.4
JPN NOR
From (j) From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMRV From others SS ADS OSS SMRV From others
SS 78.4 7.5 5.8 8.3 21.6 82.5 7.5 6.6 3.4 17.5
ADS 1.7 90.0 2.7 5.6 10.0 2.2 86.9 3.8 7.2 13.1
OSS 7.7 9.9 73.4 9.0 26.6 6.2 7.4 71.5 15.0 28.5
SMRV 3.5 8.5 6.3 81.7 18.3 6.9 4.8 8.4 79.9 20.1
Contr. to others 12.9 25.9 14.8 22.9 Tot. Connectedness 15.3 19.6 18.8 25.6 Tot. Connectedness
Contr. incl. own 91.3 115.9 88.3 104.6 Measure=19.1% 97.8 106.5 90.3 105.5 Measure=19.8%
Net connectedness -8.7 15.9 -11.8 4.6 -2.2 6.5 -9.7 5.5
RUS UK
From (j) From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMRV From others SS ADS OSS SMRV From others
SS 82.5 8.3 7.3 1.9 17.5 82.1 7.6 6.8 3.5 17.9
ADS 2.5 85.9 4.2 7.4 14.1 2.7 86.6 3.0 7.7 13.4
OSS 6.0 6.1 76.8 11.1 23.2 6.2 8.3 72.9 12.6 27.1
SMRV 2.8 2.8 2.8 91.6 8.4 10.2 5.3 6.9 77.6 22.4
Contr. to others 11.3 17.2 14.2 20.5 Tot. Connectedness 19.1 21.2 16.8 23.7 Tot. Connectedness
Contr. incl. own 93.8 103.1 91.0 112.1 Measure=15.8% 101.2 107.8 89.7 101.3 Mesasure=20.2%
Net connectedness -6.2 3.1 -9.0 12.1 1.2 7.8 -10.3 1.3
US
From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMRV From others
SS 78.4 7.8 7.7 6.1 21.6
ADS 2.4 88.2 4.0 5.5 11.8
OSS 6.9 7.9 78.1 7.0 21.9
SMRV 11.4 4.4 10.2 73.9 26.1
Contr. to others 20.7 20.1 21.9 18.6 Tot. Connectedness
Contr. incl. own 99.1 108.3 100.0 92.6 Measure=20.4%
Net connectedness -0.9 8.3 0.0 -7.5
Note: Connectedness measures, given by Equations (2)-(6), calculated from variance decompositions based
on 12-step-ahead forecasts.
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Table 4: Oil price shocks and stock market implied volatility, connectedness table (1995:09 – 2013:07)
FRA GER
From (j) From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMIV From others SS ADS OSS SMIV From others
SS 81.2 9.5 7.1 2.2 18.8 84.6 6.6 7.0 1.9 15.4
ADS 2.6 91.8 4.0 1.6 8.2 3.1 90.7 4.1 2.1 9.3
OSS 9.6 11.1 68.9 10.4 31.1 6.3 7.5 73.1 13.1 26.9
SMIV 25.7 7.9 5.6 60.8 39.2 14.5 8.9 5.1 71.5 28.5
Contr. to others 37.9 28.6 16.6 14.2 Tot. Connectedness 23.9 23.0 16.2 17.1 Tot. Connectedness
Contr. incl. own 119.1 120.4 85.5 75.0 Measure=24.3% 108.5 113.7 89.2 88.6 Measure=20.0%
Net connectedness 19.1 20.4 -14.5 -25.0 8.5 13.7 -10.7 11.4
JPN UK
From (j) From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMIV From others SS ADS OSS SMIV From others
SS 77.5 7.7 7.4 7.4 22.5 76.6 10.3 7.3 5.8 23.4
ADS 1.8 90.1 3.8 4.3 9.9 3.6 91.5 3.8 1.1 8.5
OSS 6.7 9.7 79.6 4.0 20.4 8.8 11.4 67.5 12.3 32.5
SMIV 8.8 25.9 10.4 54.9 45.1 31.9 8.5 5.5 54.1 45.9
Contr. to others 17.4 43.3 21.6 15.7 Tot. Connectedness 44.2 30.2 16.6 19.2 Tot. Connectedness
Contr. incl. own 94.9 133.3 101.2 70.6 Measure=24.5% 120.8 121.8 84.1 73.3 Measure=27.6%
Net connectedness -6.5 -6.3 -7.2 20 -1.2 7.3 -12.2 6
US
From (j)
To (i) SS ADS OSS SMIV From others
SS 80.7 7.4 7.9 4.0 19.3
ADS 2.6 90.7 4.3 2.4 9.3
OSS 6.0 8.2 75.7 10.0 24.3
SMIV 8.2 9.8 10.8 71.2 28.8
Contr. to others 16.8 25.5 23.0 16.5 Tot. Connectedness
Contr. incl. own 97.5 116.1 98.7 87.7 Measure=20.4%
Net connectedness -0.9 8.3 0.0 -7.5
Note: Connectedness measures, given by Equations (2)-(6), calculated from variance decompositions based
on 12-step-ahead forecasts.
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Online Appendix
A.1. Gross directional connectedness between oil price shocks and stock market
returns
The time-varying gross directional connectedness from (to) each variable to (from) all others
are defined in equations (6)–(7). The gross directional connectedness from (to) each variable
to (from) all others are presented in Figures A.1 and A.2, respectively.
[Insert Figures A.1 and A.2 around here]
Starting with the supply–side shocks (SS), we observe a structural break in their con-
tribution to connectedness in the post–2009 period. In particular, low connectedness exists
until 2009, whereas an increasing pattern in shocks deriving from oil–supply shocks is evi-
dent thereafter, reaching a peak towards the end of the Great Recession. Notably, the peak
for all European countries of our sample is evident almost two years later, at the end of
2010, i.e. immediately after the outbreak of the Eurozone debt crisis. A similar behaviour
(although from the reverse angle) is observed in terms of shocks towards the supply–side
shocks. These gross directional connectedness measures exhibit a stable pattern at about
20% level until 2009 (where a peak in reached), while a decline is observed thereafter (at
the levels of about 10-15%).
A structural break is also evident in the gross directional connectedness from and to
aggregate demand shocks (ADS). More specifically, gross directional connectedness from
aggregate demand shocks are high until 2009 (at about 25-50% level), when they reach
their peak, whereas a continued decline is observed in the post–Great Recession period (the
only exception is Russia). In terms of the gross directional connectedness to aggregate
demand shocks we notice that they are volatile and heterogeneous among countries until
2009, whereas a stable and increasing pattern is noticeable thereafter.
Furthermore, connectedness associated with oil–specific demand shocks (OSS) appears
to decline remarkably during the peak years of the Great Recession with the exception of
Japan. On the other hand, for all countries of our sample, the magnitude of shocks received
by oil–specific demand shocks is relatively stable, at about 20%.
Considering the connectedness running from stock market returns (SMR) shocks, we
observe that they tend to fluctuate at the level of about 25% reaching, though, a trough in
2009 (although the reverse holds true for Russia). At the other end of the spectrum, stock
market returns receive shocks at a rather stable pattern, reaching a spike at the heart of the
Great Recession (with the exception of Italy).
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Figure A.1: Directional spillovers FROM oil price shocks and stock market returns to all others
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Figure A.2: Directional spillovers TO oil price shocks and stock market returns from all others
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A.2. Gross directional connectedness between oil price shocks and stock market
(realized and implied) volatility
This section presents the gross directional connectedness from (to) each variable to (from)
all others for both the realized and implied volatilities. The gross directional connectedness
measures based on the realized volatility are presented in Figures A.3 and A.4, respectively.
[Insert Figures A.3 and A.4 around here]
Starting with the supply–side shocks (SS), these appear to contribute considerably in
the years during the Great Recession for the oil–importing countries and during 2010–2011
for the oil–exporting countries. We notice, though, that some exemptions exist among the
net oil–importing countries (i.e. China, Japan and the US), as a peak is reached in these
countries immediately after the period of the Great Recession, resembling the connectedness
patterns of the net oil–exporting countries. By contrast, supply–side shocks receive shocks
mainly in the pre–Great Recession period.
Turning to aggregate demand shocks (ADS), these contribute considerably to shocks in
all other variables in the pre–Great Recession period. Furthermore, with the exception of
Russia, the UK and the US, shocks generated by aggregate demand shocks attain a peak
at the heart of the financial crisis. On the other hand, aggregate demand shocks appear to
receive shocks throughout the period of study without following a stable path.
As far as the oil–specific demand shocks (OSS) are concerned, they seem to contribute
more in the years that followed the Great Recession, while all other variables tend to instigate
shocks to oil–specific demand shocks at a rather stable pace throughout the period of study,
reaching a peak during the years of the Great Recession.
Considering the stock market realized volatility (SMRV) shocks, results regarding effects
from this variable to all other variables seem to be country specific. Nonetheless, we note
that in all European countries a peak is reached in the years immediately before the onset
of the Great Recession. Turning to shocks exerted on stock market realized volatility, these
appear to be rather stable (at about 10-20% level) throughout the period of study, reaching
a peak at the heart of the Great Recession.
Finally, we notice that the gross directional connectedness measures based on implied
volatilities (see, Figures A.5 and A.6) are exhibiting a very similar behaviour with those
based on the realized volatility.
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Figure A.3: Directional spillovers FROM oil price shocks and stock market realised volatility to all others
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Figure A.4: Directional spillovers TO oil price shocks and stock market realised volatility from all others
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Figure A.5: Directional spillovers FROM oil price shocks and stock market implied volatility to all others
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Figure A.6: Directional spillovers TO oil price shocks and stock market implied volatility from all others
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